ABSTRACT
Purpose This study examines the lack of confidence in the actions of the government and pharmaceutical companies during vaccine deployment. The authors introduce the concept of supply chain immunity. The authors test whether the perception of higher vaccine supply chain immunity leads to higher willingness to be vaccinated within the supply chain community. Design/methodology/approach The authors utilize factor analysis and item response theory methods to develop a scale for measuring supply chain immunity. The original and psychometrically sound scale is tested via a structural equation model (SEM). Factor analysis and SEM use survey responses from two samples of 125 supply chain executives. Findings SEM suggests that supply chain immunity perceptions are a strong predictor of overall supply chain confidence for COVID vaccines. Further, these perceptions, through supply chain confidence, indirectly impact individuals' self-reported willingness to personally accept a vaccine themselves. Originality/value This paper presents the concept of supply chain immunity perceptions that have not been used in the medical supply chain literature. This paper presents a first-of-a-kind scale for supply chain immunity perceptions utilizing nascent methods and demonstrates the constructs impact on vaccine program confidence and public willingness to participate.
ABSTRACT
We explore supply chain visibility challenges in the context of our contemporary COVID pandemic, and offer insights, models and potential solutions to remove barriers to clear supply chain visibility. In this paper, we describe how visibility and velocity are the two key attributes that are required to enabling critical decision-making accuracy which will in turn increase the ability of local, state and federal healthcare and public health decision-makers to response to shifts in the U.S. system. We describe the problems in current systems due to the lack of visibility of material in global supply chains, which in turn leads to problems such as the lack of PPE that occurred during the COVID pandemic. We conclude with recommendations on how to render inventory more visible for the future.
ABSTRACT
Policy Points Reflecting on current response deficiencies, we offer a model for a national contingency supply chain cell (NCSCC) construct to manage the medical materials supply chain in support of emergencies, such as COVID-19. We develop the following: a framework for governance and response to enable a globally independent supply chain; a flexible structure to accommodate the requirements of state and county health systems for receiving and distributing materials; and a national material "control tower" to improve transparency and real-time access to material status and location. CONTEXT: Much of the discussion about the failure of the COVID-19 supply chain has centered on personal protective equipment (PPE) and the degree of vulnerability of care. Prior research on supply chain risks have focused on mitigating the risk of disruptions of specific purchased materials within a bounded region or on the shifting status of cross-border export restrictions. But COVID-19 has impacted every purchase category, region, and border. This paper is responsive to the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine recommendation to study and monitor disasters and to provide governments with course of action to satisfy legislative mandates. METHODS: Our analysis draws on our observations of the responses to COVID-19 in regard to acquisition and contracting problem-solving, our review of field discussions and interactions with experts, a critique of existing proposals for managing the strategic national stockpile in the United States a mapping of the responses to national contingency planning phases, and the identification of gaps in current national healthcare response policy frameworks and proposals. FINDINGS: Current proposals call for augmenting a system that has failed to deliver the needed response to COVID-19. These proposals do not address the key attributes for pandemic plan renewal: flexibility, traceability and transparency, persistence and responsiveness, global independence, and equitable access. We offer a commons-based framework for achieving the opportunities and risks which are responsive to a constellation of intelligence assets working in and across focal targets of global supply chain risk. CONCLUSIONS: The United States needs a "commons-based strategy" that is not simply a stockpile repository but instead is a network of repositories, fluid inventories, and analytic monitoring governed by the experts. We need a coordinated effort, a "commons" that will direct both conventional and new suppliers to meet demands and to eliminate hoarding and other behaviors.